TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/caps/87/87capcon.4

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                A-                                                          ╚July 27, 1987

IRAN-CONTRA

The Admiral Takes the Hit


Poindexter says he never told Reagan about the diversion of
arms profits


Throughout his career, John Poindexter had played by the rules.
As a vice admiral in the U.S. Navy, he was regarded as a
painstakingly efficient officer who paid scrupulous attention
to the chain of command, never challenging his superiors, always
following orders to the letter. Indeed, one commanding officer
characterized Poindexter as "totally loyal and trustworthy, and
a thorough briefer who rarely interjected his own viewpoints."
But as Ronald Reagan's National Security Adviser from December
1985 to November 1986, Poindexter told his questioners last
week, he broke that pattern. In February 1986, after just two
months on the job, he decided to usurp the authority of his
Commander in Chief.

In his testimony before the congressional committees
investigating the Iran-contra affair, Poindexter insisted he and
he alone gave final approval to Lieut. Colonel Oliver North's
proposal to take profits from U.S. arms sales to Iran and divert
them to the Nicaraguan rebel forces. He claimed to have
exercised this authority without ever telling the President, so
as to protect Reagan from the "politically volatile issue" that
subsequently exploded on them. "I made the decision,"
Poindexter declared in an even, mater-of-fact tone. "I was
convinced that the President would, in the end, thing it was a
good idea. But I did not want him to be associated with the
decision."

Moreover, Poindexter said, his extraordinary exercise of
authority did not end with the contra diversion. As the scandal
was breaking last November, Poindexter testified, he destroyed
a piece of vital evidence: a covert-action finding, drafted by
the CIA and signed by the President in December 1985, that
retroactively approved Israel's shipments of U.S. arms to the
Iranians. The document, said the admiral, depicted the weapons
transactions as a straight arms-for-hostages swap with Iran
rather than a diplomatic effort to establish contacts with
Iranian moderates, as the President has maintained. "I thought
it was politically embarrassing," said Poindexter of the
finding. "I tore it up, put it in the burn basket behind my
desk."

To the President's supporters, Poindexter's confession was a
turning point in the Iran-contra melodrama, resolving one of the
essential issues of the scandal. There would be no evidence
directly linking Reagan to the ugly and possibly unlawful use
of money garnered by selling weapons to terrorists. While the
White House staff breathed a sigh of relief over the admiral's
disclosure, Reagan at first seemed nonchalant. "What's new
about that?" he shrugged. "I've been saying that for seven
months."

But Poindexter's testimony still has devastating implications.
If the admiral is to be believed, his story reveals a startling
lack of accountability in the White House. "If the President
didn't know, in some ways it's more serious than if he did,"
said House Majority Leader Thomas Foley. "Presidents ought to
be allowed to create their own political disasters," said
Republican Senator Warren Rudman of New Hampshire. "Nobody else
ought to do it for them."

Was Reagan's famous management style so lax that his newly
appointed National Security Adviser could feel free to run a
highly sensitive covert operation without ever informing the
President or any of his other top advisers? White House aides
rejected the idea. The President, they said, was angry when he
learned that Poindexter had authorized the diversion. Asserted
Chief of Staff Howard Baker: "The President has said, 'I did not
know it, and had I known about it, I would have stopped it.'
That's the totality of it." Confronted with the White House
statement, Poindexter calmly stuck to his story that Reagan
would have approved his decision. "People can draw their own
conclusions, I guess," he said.

To some members of the Iranscam committees, Poindexter's
testimony simply did not wash. "I just don't believe what he
says," remarked Democratic Congressman Louis Stokes of Ohio.
"It does not appear logical that a man of his intellect and
management skills would arrogate unto himself the responsibility
of making a monumental decision affecting the President."

In fact, the self-portrait drawn by the admiral last week did
not appear logical in several respects: the naval officer known
for his lack of political savvy making a crucial political
judgment call; the strict by-the-book staff man reborn as a
renegade who followed his own lights in deciding what Reagan
should and should not know. "It doesn't make any sense," said
a committee staffer. "This man wants you to believe that he
risked the entire presidency on a set of decisions he thought
were either too controversial or too unimportant to belabor the
President with."  Senate Panel Chairman Daniel Inouye called
Poindexter's testimony "incredible, mind boggling, chilling."

The performance fueled rather than stilled speculation in
Washington that Poindexter was the Administration's designated
scapegoat for the scandal. In earlier testimony North, who was
Poindexter's hyperactive aide at the NSC, claimed he and
Director of Central Intelligence William Casey had often
discussed the intricacies of the Iran-contra operation.
According to North, Casey said the Marine might have to play the
"fall guy," taking blame for the entire operation if it was ever
exposed. On further consideration, Casey speculated that North
might not be "senior enough" to make a credible scapegoat:  the
CIA director suggested Poindexter would have to share the role.

Poindexter testified that he had never heard of any scapegoat
plan. But some thought the admiral was indeed falling on his
sword for the sake of Ronald Reagan. "This man will never say
anything that reflects adversely on his Commander in Chief,"
said Senate Counsel Arthur Liman. "How do we know he's not
still protecting the President?"

Poindexter, 50, related his amazing tale in ordinary,
conversational tones, then broke out his pipe and lit up, as if
he had come to the end of an after-dinner story. He
matter-of-factly told the panel of the day in February 1986 when
North said he had found a way to fund the contras with profits
from the arms sales to Iran. At the time the rebels were
running out of the $27 million in humanitarian aid the U.S. had
granted them in 1985. Poindexter saw the diversion scheme as
a way of providing "bridge financing" for the contras while the
Administration struggled to persuade Congress to approve a $100
million aid package. "I thought it was a neat idea too,"
Poindexter said, echoing North's description of the deal.

Poindexter recognized that the diversion would be as
controversial as it was neat. Thus, he said, he approved it
without informing Reagan, in order to "provide some future
deniability for the President if it ever leaked out."
Poindexter argued that in authorizing the deal he was not making
policy; he was only carrying out Reagan's established
objectives. "My role was to make sure that his policies were
implemented," said Poindexter. "In this case, the policy was
very clear, and that was to support the contras."  After working
in the WHite House since June 1981, he said, "I was convinced
that I understood the President's thinking on this."

Poindexter contended that during daily briefings he reported to
Reagan "in general terms" on the status of the contras. He said
he told the President of North's "instrumental" role in helping
sustain the rebels, filling Reagan in on the secret airstrip
built in Costa Rica by North's contra resupply network. The
admiral said that while the President knew the rebels were being
supported by private donations and contributions from third
countries, he never asked where precisely the money was coming
from. "The President...is not a man for great detail," said
Poindexter, inadvertently provoking chuckles from the audience.

Poindexter insisted that he never discussed the division with
any Administration official other than North. The admiral said
he refrained from talking about the scheme with Casey--even
though the CIA had been deeply involved in previous contra
activities. His rational was that Casey often had to testify
before the congressional intelligence-oversight committees and
Poindexter did not want him to have to lie. North, however,
told the Iran-contra committees that Casey knew all about the
diversion.

Though Poindexter had the gumption to authorize the diversion,
he seemed not to want to know too much about the deals:  he
testified that he never asked North how much money was being
diverted to the contras; the admiral, known for his attention
to detail, said he was not concerned with such bits of
"micro-management."

Poindexter said he cautioned North against putting any
information about contra support on paper. Nevertheless, North
testified that he sent Poindexter five memorandums, each
outlining the details of a specific transfer of arms proceeds
to the contras. Each paper recommended briefing the President
and seeking his approval of the transaction. North said he
never knew if Reagan saw the memos, but he shredded all his
copies of the documents when he learned that the arms deals
might come to light. One memo, however, escaped the shredder
and was discovered by investigators from the Justice Department.

Poindexter not only denied showing Reagan the surviving memo but
said he could not recall receiving any diversion memos from
North. Under questioning by Liman, Poindexter said that even
if North had sent him the memos, he would not have discussed any
aspect of the diversion with the President; he had made a
"deliberate decision" not to do so.

The first time the admiral could remember seeing the infamous
diversion memo at all was when Meese directly confronted him
with it last Nov. 24. Poindexter said he promptly offered to
resign; on the following day the Attorney General instructed him
to do so. Strangely, however, Meese never asked Poindexter who
approved the transfer of arms profits to the contras. Nor did
White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan question Poindexter
about the diversion.

An incredulous Liman asked the witness why he did not say, "I,
Admiral Poindexter, made the decision and did not tell the
President of the United States."  Poindexter's lame reply:
although he gave the notion "a lot of thought," he waited to
consult his attorneys. The result, as Senator Rudman pointed
out, was "the agony that we've had for the last eight months"
as Reagan was battered with questions about his role in the
scandal.

At the time of the Meese inquiry, Poindexter said, one of his
aides turned up a finding that authorized U.S. facilitation of
a November 1985 sale of 18 Hawk anti-aircraft missiles from
Israel to Iran. Poindexter testified that he watched Reagan sign
the document on or about Dec.5, 1985, his first day as NSC
chief. The problem with this finding, said Poindexter, was that
it depicted the transaction as a trade of arms for the release
of Americans being held hostage in Lebanon. The paper would be
superseded in January by a finding that explained the weapons
sales and freedom for the hostages as part of a broad initiative
to re-establish diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Iran.
Poindexter said he had forgotten about the year-old document
until his aide handed it to him last Nov. 21. Moments later
Poindexter ripped it up and had the scraps incinerated.
Explained the admiral"  "I simply didn't want this document to
see the light of day."

Poindexter was not alone in forgetting the 1985 finding. Last
winter Reagan told the Tower commission that he had approved the
initial Hawk shipment before the fact. The President later told
the board members that he had had no prior awareness of the
transaction. Finally, he wrote a note to the Tower board saying,
"The simple truth is I don't remember--period."  After
Poindexter's disclosure last week, the President still said he
does not remember signing the finding.

Many sections of the admiral's testimony were marred by evasive
answers, confusion over details and awkward twists of logic.
Among Poindexter's other significant revelations:

--Unlike Robert McFarlane, his predecessor as National Security
Adviser, Poindexter said he did not feel that the NSC staff was
covered by the Boland amendment, which prohibited assistance to
the Nicaraguan rebels by U.S. military or intelligence
agencies. Although the NSC directed the contra-resupply network,
Poindexter told Congress that his agency was adhering to the
letter and spirit of the law. How so?  "By keeping the other
departments that were covered by the Boland amendment out of the
issue."

--After North successfully convinced members of the House
Intelligence Committee that he was not involved in covert
support for the contras in 1986, Poindexter sent his aide a
computer message saying, "Well done."  House Counsel John Nields
asked Poindexter last week if he had authorized North to lie to
Congress. The admiral replied that he did not instruct North
to lie, only to "withhold information."

--North testified that Director Casey had hoped to use some of
the profits from the Iran arms sales to set up a secret account
to finance covert operations without congressional oversight.
Poindexter said he had never heard such a plan discussed "in
that depth."  He added, "It's an idea that has some attractive
features in my mind."

The vigorous, outspoken North had provided a stark contrast to
his seemingly unflappable NSC boss during his six days of
sometimes impassioned testimony. By the time North left the
witness chair last Tuesday, he had been transformed into an
international celebrity. But in his final hours on the stand,
the Marine who had offered the committee lengthy discourses on
patriotism and geopolitics got a dose of his own medicine. Most
of the 26 panel members lectured North on his flawed view of
democracy and the significance of the scandal. Senator William
Cohen, a Maine Republican, criticized the colonel and his
associates for attempting to act on a contra policy that did
not have the support of most Americans. "A democracy demands
not only that the rights of the minority be respected," said
Cohen, "but that the rules of the majority be respected. And
that's true even if you and I believe the majority is wrong."

Indiana Democrat Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House panel and
a widely respected student of foreign affairs, summed up the
serious implications of the scandal with special eloquence. "I
am impressed that policy was driven by a series of lies," said
Hamilton in a soft, steady baritone. "Lies to the Iranians,
lies to the CIA, lies to the Attorney General, lies to our
friends and allies, lies to the Congress and lies to the
American people."  Hamilton reminded North of one of Thomas
Jefferson's credos:  "The whole art of government consists in
the art of being honest."

Poindexter's testimony revealed even more layers of deceptions
obscuring what really happened in the tortuous Iran-contra
affair. After the admiral's dubious story, members of the
investigation may suspect that they will never hear the full
truth about the scandal.

--By Jacob V. Lamar Jr. Reported by Michael Duffy and Hays
Gorey/Washington